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Individual choices are either based on personal experience or on information provided by peers.
The latter case, causes individuals to conform to the majority in their neighborhood. Such herding
behavior may be very efficient in aggregating disperse private information, thereby revealing the
optimal choice. However if the majority relies on herding, this mechanism may dramatically fail to
aggregate correctly the information, causing the majority adopting the wrong choice. We address
these issues in a simple model of interacting agents who aim at giving a correct forecast of a public
variable, either seeking private information or resorting to herding. As the fraction of herders
increases, the model features a phase transition beyond which a state where most agents make the
correct forecast coexists with one where most of them are wrong. Simple strategic considerations
suggest that indeed such a system of agents self-organizes deep in the coexistence region. There,
agents tend to agree much more among themselves than with what they aim at forecasting, as found
in recent empirical studies.
Information affects in many subtle ways socio-
economic behavior, giving rise to non-trivial collective
phenomena. For example, a key function of markets
is that of aggregating the information scattered among
traders into prices. However, if traders rely on the in-
formation conveyed by prices, this same mechanism may
lead to self-sustaining speculative bubbles. Likewise, we
deduce the worth of a restaurant or the importance of
a research subject from its crowdedness or popularity.
However, popularity can consecrate even totally random
choices [1].
Collective herding phenomena in general pose quite
interesting problems in statistical physics. To name a
few examples, anomalous fluctuations in financial mar-
kets [2, 5, 6], opinion dynamics [3, 4] and the way in
which social changes take place [7] have been related to
percolation and random field Ising models. It is natu-
ral to expect herding behavior when it is convenient for
the individuals to follow the herd. For example, when
the majority is buying in the stock market, prices go up,
hence buying becomes the right thing to do (at least in
the short run). If a technology (e.g. fax machine) is
widely adopted, it becomes more convenient to adopt it.
Herding takes place even in cases where agents’ behavior
does not influence the outcome, if agents try to infer in-
formation about the optimal choice from the actions of
others. Ref. [1] discusses the relevance of these consid-
erations for issues ranging from the prevalence of crime,
marketing, fads and fashions to the onset of protests such
as that leading to the collapse of the East German regime.
Ref. [8] remarks that herding might explain why financial
forecasters tend to make very similar predictions – whose
diversity is much smaller than the prediction’s error.
From the theoretical side, the onset of herding and
the resulting failure of information aggregation has been
shown to occur in models of information cascades [1].
The prototype example is that of a number of individu-
als choosing one of two restaurants on the basis of some
private noisy information. If each of them follows the
recommendation of his/her private signal, the majority
will choose the best restaurant. However if an individ-
ual can observe what others have chosen before, he/she
can infer their information from their choices and take
advantage of this. This however leads him/her to fol-
low the crowd disregarding private information. As a
result, choices disclose no further information and there
is a sizeable probability that all people enter the worse
restaurant.
In this letter, we show that information herding can
bring to non-trivial collective phenomena even when
agents observe a finite number of peers and act in no par-
ticular order. In particular, a population of selfish agents
fails to correctly aggregate information because herding
brings the system into a coexistence region, where the
vast majority of agents “agrees” on the same forecast,
not necessarily the right one. A statistical mechanics ap-
proach gives a detailed account of the results in terms
of a zero temperature spin model with asymmetric inter-
action. These insights extend to the case where agents
have to forecast a variable in a continuous interval. Again
we find a spinodal point beyond which forecasts tend to
cluster, as observed in Ref. [8].
Let us consider a population of agents who have to fore-
cast a binary event E ∈ {±1}. Each agent i = 1, . . . , N
faces the choice of either looking for information or herd-
ing. We shall denote by I and H , respectively, these two
strategies, as well as the set of agents who follow them.
In the former case agent i ∈ I receives some private in-
formation θi ∈ {±1} about E. We assume that θi is
drawn independently ∀i ∈ I with P{fi = E} = p > 1/2,
i.e. that private signals are informative about E. On
the basis of this signal, agent i makes a forecast fi = θi.
In the case of strategy H , agents receive a private in-
formation θi = ±1 which is uncorrelated with E (i.e.
P{θi = ±1} = 1/2 i.i.d. for all i ∈ H). Each agent
i ∈ H information gathered by a sample group of other
agents: He/she forms a sample group Gi by picking an
odd number K of other agents at random, observes their
forecasts fj and sets his/her forecast to that of the ma-
jority of agents j ∈ Gi. Notice first that j ∈ Gi – i.e.
2i observing j – does not imply that i ∈ Gj – i.e. that
j observes i. Secondly, the forecast of i may depend on
the forecast of other agents who are themselves herd-
ing. Hence we assume that forecasts are formed by the
following iterative process, mimiking a sort of informa-
tion exchange: Forecasts are initialized to private signals
fi = θi for all i. Next, an agent i ∈ H is chosen at ran-
dom and its forecast is updated to that of the majority
of j ∈ Gi
fi → f ′i = sign
∑
j∈Gi
fj. (1)
This process is repeated until it converges and we denote
simply by fj the fixed point values of the forecasts. It is
important to stress that agents receive information on E
and form their forecast only after they have chosen their
strategy. In other words, agents have access to either
type of information but not to both. This is natural if
both strategies imply a fixed cost: then either agents in-
vest in information seeking or in forming a sample group.
Before dealing with the game theoretic case where each
agent chooses a strategy so as to maximize a payoff, let
us focus on the case where a fixed fraction η of agents
follow the H strategy and the rest follows the I strategy.
By definition, the probability of a right forecast of i ∈ I
is P{fi = E|i ∈ I} = p, whereas for i ∈ H we define
q ≡ 1
ηN
∑
i∈H
δfi,E ≃ P{fi = E|i ∈ H}. (2)
The inset of Fig. 1 shows the behavior of q as a func-
tion of η in typical numerical simulations. The aver-
age 〈q〉 of q over different realizations is also reported
in Fig. 1. When η is small, herding is quite efficient
and it yields more accurate predictions than information
seeking (〈q〉 > p). Actually the probability 〈q〉 that H-
players end up with the correct forecast increases with η
up to a maximum. This is because herders use the in-
formation of other herders who have themselves a higher
performance than private information forecasters. How-
ever beyond a certain point, outcomes with a value q < p
start to appear, coexisting with outcomes with q ≈ 1.
Consequently the average 〈q〉 starts decreasing. The low
q state becomes more and more probable as η increases,
and for η close to one we find 〈q〉 < p.
In order to shed light on the above results, let us notice
that the probability of a randomly drawn agent to give
the right forecast is
P{fi = E} ≡ π = (1 − η)p+ ηq. (3)
In order to derive an equation for q we observe that a
herding agent adopts the point of view of the majority of
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FIG. 1: The average success q of herding agents is shown, for
simulations (symbols) and for the analytical solution (dotted
lines) as a function of the herding probability η for K = 11,
p = 0.55 (horizontal line) and N = 200 (+) 103 () and 104
(⋄) agents. The stable solutions q± are shown as full lines
whereas the unstable one qu is shown as a dashed line. Inset:
individual realizations of q for the same systems above.
his K randomly drawn agents, i.e.
q = ΣK(π) ≡ P

sign
∑
j∈Gi
fj = E|i ∈ H


=
K∑
g=(K+1)/2
(
K
g
)
πg(1− π)K−g (4)
These are two self consistent equations for q. For a given
value of p, the solution is unique for η < ηc(p,K) whereas
for η > ηc(p,K), as shown in Fig. 1, we find three so-
lutions, which we denote by q+ > qu > q−. The critical
point ηc increases with p and with K.
A direct calculation shows that the average number
of fixed points of Eqs. (1) is dominated by configura-
tions {fi} for which q satisfies Eqs. (3,4). Interest-
ingly, we find that the average number of fixed points
N ≃ (KKe−K/K!)ηN is the same on all the solutions.
Linear stability shows that the fixed points q± are sta-
ble whereas the one at qu is unstable. To see this, imagine
that at iteration t, the fraction of agents i ∈ H with a
correct forecast is q(t) = q∗ + δq(t), where q∗ is a solu-
tion of q∗ = ΣK [ηq
∗ + (1 − η)p]. Then at time t + 1 we
have δq(t + 1) ≃ Σ′Kηδq(t), and it is easy to show that
δq vanishes for q∗ = q± whereas it diverges exponentially
for q∗ = qu. The unstable solution qu separates the basin
of attraction of the fixed points q±. This allows us to
estimate the probability p− that the system converges to
the fixed point q−, which is the probability that the ini-
tial value of q(0) falls below qu. Given that variables θi
are assigned a random sign for i ∈ H , q(0) is well approx-
imated by a gaussian variable of mean zero and variance
31/(ηN). Hence
p− ≡ P{q(0) < qu} ∼= 1
2
erfc
(√
ηN/2(1− 2qu)
)
. (5)
The expected value of q is then given by
〈q〉 = p−q− + (1− p−)q+. (6)
Fig. 1 shows that Eq. (6) agrees very well with numerical
simulations for large N . The discrepancy for small N
comes from the fact that indeed the dynamics of q(τ)
is subject to a noise term of order 1/
√
N which causes
transitions across qu in the early stages of the dynamics
for small N . It is easy to show that, for η ≈ 1,
qu ≃ 1
2
− (p− 1/2)k!!
k!!− (k − 1)!! (1− η) +O(1 − η)
2 (7)
which shows that there is a window of size 1/
√
N close to
η = 1 where p− is sizeable. As a consequence, the fall of
q in this region gets steeper and steeper as N increases.
This consideration is important if we analyze the be-
havior of selfish agents following game theory [9]. We
assume for simplicity that agents aim at reaching a cor-
rect forecast, i.e. that their payoff is the probability that
fi = E. As long as 〈q〉 > p agents will find it more
convenient to switch from the I to H strategy. Hence,
the fraction η of herders increases when 〈q〉 > p. The
contrary is true when 〈q〉 < p and hence we expect that
the population will self-organize to a state η∗, such that
no agent has incentive to change strategy, i.e. where
〈q〉 = p. Such a state is called a Nash equilibrium [9].
Its standard interpretation as the equilibrium of forward
looking rational agents, who correctly anticipate the be-
havior of others, given the rules of the game, and respond
optimally, requires agents to solve a rather complex sta-
tistical mechanical problem. We will however show below
that adaptive agents with limited rationality can “learn”
to converge to such a Nash equilibrium.
In light of the the results discussed above, the point
where 〈q〉 = p – the Nash equilibrium – is attained when
all but a fraction 1 − η∗ ∼ N−1/2 of agents takes the
H strategy. In addition, because in this region q+ ∼= 1
and q− ∼= 0, by Eq. (6)we have p− ∼= 1 − p. This means
that the whole population adopts the wrong forecast with
probability 1−p, as if it were a single individual forecast-
ing on the basis of private information. Such a spectac-
ular event is similar to the outcome of information cas-
cades [1], but it takes place in a quite different setting.
Does this scenario changes when we introduce het-
erogeneity in agents’ characteristics? Let us first con-
sider the case where agent i, when using strategy H ,
can observe Ki peers. Na¨ively one would expect that
agents with larger Ki receive more precise information
and hence should prefer the H strategy. However, be-
cause at the Nash equilibrium almost every agent is mak-
ing the same prediction, either right or wrong, a larger
“window” Ki does not help. The case where agents have
different individual forecasting abilities, i.e. when pi de-
pends on i, is a bit more complex. It is reasonable to
assume that “expert” agents with pi > 〈q〉 will seek pri-
vate information whereas those with pi < 〈q〉 will herd.
Again q is given by Eqs. (3,4) with
η =
∫ 〈q〉
0
dp φ(p), (1− η)p =
∫ 1
〈q〉
dp p φ(p) (8)
where φ(p) is the distribution of pi. It is easy to show
that a solution of Eqs. (3,4,8) with q = 〈q〉, i.e. where η
and p do not fall in the coexistence region is not possible.
Indeed the only solution of ΣK [q
∫ q
0
dpφ(p)+
∫ 1
q
dppφ(p)] =
q is at q = 1, which implies η = 1. The solution then lies
in the coexistence region, where Eqs. (3,4) have three
solutions, and it is found computing 〈q〉 as before from
Eqs. (5,6) as a function of η and p, and then using Eq.
(8) to compute η and p self-consistently. Again, the Nash
equilibrium lies where p− ≃ 1 − 〈q〉 is finite as N → ∞,
which, by Eqs. (5,7), implies that η∗ → 1 in this limit.
The results are illustrated in Fig. 2 for the particular
case φ(p) = β2β(1− p)β−1, p ∈ [1/2, 1]. When β is large,
there is small heterogeneity and pi ≃ 1/2: Almost all
agents follow the H strategy (η ≈ 1) and the probability
of a wrong forecast p− ≃ 1/2 is large. As β decreases,
the number of “experts”, i.e. agents with pi > 〈q〉 in-
creases, and correspondingly also the performance of the
population as a whole improves (i.e. q increases and p−
decreases). In this region, asymptotic analysis shows that
the fraction of “experts” 1− η ∼√logN/N .
The analytical results were tested against numerical
simulations of adaptive agents who repeatedly play the
game and learn, in the course of time, about their op-
timal choice. In order to do this, agents compute the
cumulative payoff for both strategies and adopt the strat-
egy with the largest score [10]. As expected, we find that
in each run there is a value q such that all agents with
pi > q play the I strategy whereas those with pi < q
herd. Again some deviations occur for small N but the
agreement improves as N increases. This shows that the
type of equilibria we discuss are “learnable” by a pop-
ulation of not extremely sophisticated agents. It is well
known that the type of reinforcement learning dynam-
ics discussed above has close analogies with evolutionary
dynamics [11]. Hence the above scenario, might as well
describe social norms which are the result of evolutionary
processes.
The insights of the discrete model hold also when agents
have to forecast a continuous variableE. In order to show
this, we adopt an asymmetric version of the continuous
opinion model of Ref. [4], where a population ofN agents
submits forecasts {fi} of a continuous event E ∈ [0, 1].
Again, forecasters may either seek private information
(strategy I) or herd (strategy H). All I agents receive a
signal fi ∈ [0, 1] which, with probability p is “correct”,
i.e. is randomly drawn from the interval [E−ǫ, E+ǫ], and
with probability 1 − p is uniformly distributed in [0, 1].
If instead i ∈ H , we draw at random sample groups Gi
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FIG. 2: Analytical results (lines) compared to numerical sim-
ulations (symbols) for systems of N = 100 and 800 agents
with heterogeneous forecasting ability pi drawn from the dis-
tribution φ(p) = β2β(1 − p)β−1. The average success q (full
line and ◦), the fraction η of herding agents (long dashed line
and ) and the probability p− that the majority forecasts
the wrong outcome (short dashed line and +), as a function
of β. For comparison, the thin dashed line shows the average
success of agents with no herding (η = 0).
of K agents and assign initial random values f
(0)
i ∈ [0, 1]
to herding agents. Then we iterate the dynamics over
agents j of the the group Gi
f
(τ+1)
i = f
(τ)
i + µ(f
(τ)
j − f (τ)i ) θ
(
d− |f (τ)j − f (τ)i |
)
until |f (τ+1)i − f (τ)i | < ǫ. We denote simply by fi the
limit value of f
(τ)
i in this process. Note that agent i is
influenced by j ∈ Gi only if their opinion are not too far,
i.e. if |f (τ)j − f (τ)i | < d. Forecasts are considered to be
correct if |fi − E| < ǫ.
As in Ref. [8], we introduce the forecast error
Σ =
√
〈(f¯ − E)2〉 and the forecast dispersion σ =√
〈(fi − f¯)2〉 where ·¯ denotes the average over agents
whereas the average 〈. . .〉 is taken over different real-
izations of the process. The ratio φ = Σ/σ called the
empirical herding coefficient, is a measure of herding as
explained in Ref. [8]. Fig. 3 shows the results of numeri-
cal simulations of the model as a function of the fraction
η of herders, for a typical choice of the parameters. As
in the discrete model, we find that for small values of
η the probability q = P{|fi − E| < ǫ|i ∈ H} of a cor-
rect forecast for herders is larger than that of information
seeking agents (p) and it increases because herding agents
aggregate the information of other agents who are also
herding. Upon increasing η further, q reaches a maxi-
mum and then it decreases as the information entering
in the system diminishes. In this region, we find coex-
istence of a state where the vast majority of agents are
right with a state where almost all of them are wrong.
The Nash equilibrium, where both strategies are equally
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FIG. 3: Continuous forecasting model for K = 11, d = µ =
0.5, ε = 0.1. The inverse herding parameter φ−1 is only of
the order of 0.1 for a strong herding regime near the Nash
equilibrium η ≈ 0.98. The dispersion σ and the error Σ are
only shown for N = 100. Note that ηNash increases with N
whereas φNash decreases.
successful (〈q〉 = p), is precisely in this region and the
herding coefficient attains values φ ≃ 5 ÷ 10, which are
comparable to those found in Ref. [8] on a survey of earn-
ing forecasters of US, EU, UK and JP stocks during the
period 1987-2004. The fact that analysts agree with each
other five to ten times more than with the actual result,
was claimed to be related to herding effects in Ref. [8], a
conclusion fully supported by our results. Furthermore,
as in the discrete model, the Nash equilibrium moves to-
wards η = 1 as N increases, thus making herd behavior
more pronounced.
In conclusion, we introduced a simple model captur-
ing the tension between private information seeking and
exploiting information gathered by others (herding) in a
population. When few agents herd, information aggrega-
tion is very efficient. This makes herding the choice taken
by nearly the whole population, thus setting the system
deep in a “coexistence” region where the population as a
whole adopts either the right or the wrong forecast. This
scenario is rather robust and applies both to a discrete
and a continuum model and it compares well with empir-
ical findings [8]. The model and the statistical mechanics
analysis can serve as a basis to address a wide range of
related issues.
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